Optimal Growth and Uncertainty: Learning by Christos Koulovatianos et al.
Optimal Growth and Uncertainty: Learning∗
Christos Koulovatianos† Leonard J. Mirman‡
Marc Santugini§
February 14, 2008
∗We thank Marco Cagetti, Manjira Datta, David K. Levine, Toshihiko Mukoyama,
Kevin Reﬀett, John Stachurski, as well as seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank
in Richmond, the 2006 Spring CAM conference in stochastic modeling at the University of
Notre Dame, and the Fall 2006 Midwest Economic Theory Meetings at Purdue University.
†University of Vienna, Department of Economics. Email: koulovc6@univie.ac.at.
‡University of Virginia, Department of Economics. Email: lm8h@virginia.edu.
§Corresponding author. HEC Montr´ eal, Institute of Applied Economics, and CIRPEE.
Email: marc.santugini@hec.ca.
1Abstract
We introduce learning in a Brock-Mirman environment and study
the eﬀect of risk generated by the planner’s econometric activity on
optimal consumption and investment. Here, learning introduces two
sources of risk about future payoﬀs: structural uncertainty and un-
certainty from the anticipation of learning. The latter renders control
and learning nonseparable.
We present two sets of results in a learning environment. First,
conditions under which the introduction of learning increases or de-
creases optimal consumption are provided. The eﬀect depends on the
strengths and directions of the two sources of risk, which may pull in
opposite directions. Second, the eﬀects of changes in the mean and
riskiness of the distribution of the signal and initial beliefs on optimal
consumption are studied.
21 Introduction
In the early literature on optimal growth, the evolution of output was deter-
ministic, see Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965). This was a natural place to
begin the study of optimal growth since growth had already been studied in
a deterministic environment by Ramsey (1928). Brock and Mirman (1972)
introduced uncertainty in outcomes in an optimal growth model, which built
on earlier studies of stochastic positive growth, see Mirman (1972, 1973).
Uncertainty in outcomes is modeled by introducing a random shock in the
production function. Hence, the future is riskier than in the determinis-
tic case since future output is random, aﬀecting optimal consumption and
investment.
There is, however, another aspect of uncertainty that has yet to be studied
in optimal growth: uncertainty in the structure of the economy. Unlike uncer-
tainty in outcomes, structural uncertainty evolves through learning. Indeed,
by gathering and analyzing input and output data, the planner becomes an
econometrician in order to reduce structural uncertainty, while making con-
sumption and investment decisions. The introduction of learning increases
the uncertainty of future payoﬀs, which aﬀects the expected marginal utility
of investment. Here, learning introduces two sources of risk about future pay-
oﬀs: structural uncertainty and uncertainty from the anticipation of learning.
With structural uncertainty, the planner does not know the value of a
speciﬁed parameter of the distribution of the production shock, but has be-
liefs about it. Beliefs are expressed as a nondegenerate prior distribution.
Thus, the presence of structural uncertainty characterizes the beliefs compo-
nent of learning.
Moreover, given structural uncertainty, the planner anticipates the up-
dating of prior beliefs to posterior beliefs, i.e., information is gathered from
the observation of realized production shocks and processed using Bayesian
methods. Because future information is random, the anticipation component
of learning generates another source of risk. In other words, the learning pro-
cess is embedded in the dynamic program. Hence, control and learning are
entwined through the anticipation component of learning and cannot be sep-
3arated.
We introduce learning in a Brock-Mirman environment and study the
eﬀect of risk generated by the planner’s econometric activity on optimal
decisions. Previous work has focused on experimentation.1 In our model,
we assume that the signal is the realization of a random variable aﬀecting
production, and it is observed. This allows us to avoid the issue of experi-
mentation and study the eﬀect of risk due to learning.
We focus on the class of optimal stochastic growth models studied by
Mirman and Zilcha (1975), with speciﬁc utility and production functions. In
this class of models, the distributions of the production shock and beliefs are
assumed to be general. In particular, prior beliefs need not belong to the
conjugate family of the distribution of the production shock.
Two sets of results are provided for the case of learning. The ﬁrst is the
overall eﬀect of introducing learning through both its beliefs and anticipation
components. Our results extend the literature on the eﬀect of an increase in
risk in future payoﬀs on optimal consumption and investment to a learning
environment. Previous literature has focused only on models in which the
planner knows the distributions of stochastic variables. In general, the eﬀect
of an increase in risk on optimal policy functions depends on the second
derivative of some function.2 In the case of learning in a growth model, the
eﬀect of an increase in risk generated by the planner’s econometric activity
depends on some second derivatives as well.
The beliefs component aﬀects the expected marginal utility of investment.
Here, it is the second derivative of the mean of the production shock with
1Experimentation was initially studied in models in which the only link between periods
is beliefs. See Prescott (1972), Grossman et al. (1977), Easley and Kiefer (1988, 1989),
Kiefer and Nyarko (1989), Balvers and Cosimano (1990), Aghion et al. (1991), Fusselman
and Mirman (1993), Mirman et al. (1993), Treﬂer (1993), Creane (1994), Fishman and
Gandal (1994), Keller and Rady (1999), and Wieland (2000). Experimentation in a model
with capital accumulation has also been studied. See Freixas (1981), Bertocchi and Spagat
(1998), Datta et al. (2002), El-Gamal and Sundaram (1993), Huﬀman and Kiefer (1994),
Beck and Wieland (2002), and Dechert et al. (2007).
2See Leland (1968), Hahn (1970), Sandmo (1970), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971), and
Dr` eze and Modigliani (1972) for a ﬁnite-period analysis. For an inﬁnite-horizon setup, see
Mirman (1971) in a model with a single agent, and Antoniadou et al. (2007) for the case
of a game. Finally, see Huggett (2004) for a detailed review of other issues studied in this
literature.
4respect to the unknown parameter that determines the eﬀect of an increase in
risk due to structural uncertainty. If the mean of the production shock with
respect to the unknown parameter is concave, then structural uncertainty in-
creases consumption. In other words, as structural uncertainty is introduced,
the marginal utility of investment decreases, inducing less investment. And,
the marginal utility of investment increases with convexity, inducing more
investment.
The risk generated from the anticipation of learning always increases the
marginal utility of investment, leading to a decrease in consumption or pre-
cautionary investment. Here, it is the convexity of the marginal utility of
investment with respect to the mean of the production shock that leads to
precautionary investment.
The total eﬀect of learning depends on the strengths and directions of the
beliefs and anticipation components. If the mean of the production shock
with respect to the parameter is convex, then both types of risk work in the
same direction and consumption decreases. On the other hand, if the mean
of the production shock is concave, then both types of risk pull in opposite
directions and the eﬀect of learning depends on the strength of each risk.
Second, we perform a comparative analysis of distributions on the learning
planner’s optimal consumption, using the concepts of ﬁrst and second-order
stochastic dominance. Speciﬁcally, the eﬀects of changes in the mean and
riskiness of the distributions of the production shock and beliefs on opti-
mal consumption are studied. The eﬀect of riskier distributions on optimal
consumption has been studied only in stochastic dynamic models in which
the planner knows the distributions of stochastic variables. This analysis is
extended to the learning case here.
We show that, while a higher mean of the production shock decreases
consumption, a riskier distribution of the production shock has no eﬀect on
optimal consumption. The ﬁrst result is due to the structure of the Mirman-
Zilcha model, a higher mean of the production shock makes investment more
proﬁtable. The second result follows from the fact that the uncertainty in
outcomes due to the random production shock is determined solely through
its mean in a Mirman-Zilcha model, so a higher variability of the production
5shock does not aﬀect behavior. Hence, in this class of models, the learn-
ing agent reacts to the anticipation of learning, independent of the amount
of learning that takes place. Speciﬁcally, the informativeness of the signal
has no eﬀect on decisions. In other words, certainty equivalence regarding
the random production shock continues to hold in this model with learn-
ing. Changes in the mean and riskiness of the distribution of the production
shock have, nonetheless, a dynamic eﬀect on optimal consumption in the
subsequent period through posterior beliefs.
We also show that more optimistic beliefs decrease consumption if the
mean of the production shock is positively related to the unknown parame-
ter. Indeed, more optimistic beliefs increase the expected marginal utility of
investment, inducing more investment. Finally, unlike riskier distributions
of the production shock, riskier beliefs aﬀect consumption. A riskier distri-
bution of beliefs leads to an increase in uncertainty through both the beliefs
and anticipation components. The total eﬀect of riskier beliefs depends on
the strengths and directions of these two components.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce learning in a
general Brock-Mirman environment. In section 3, optimal consumption and
investment are characterized in the class of optimal stochastic growth models
studied by Mirman-Zilcha. In section 4, we study the eﬀect of introducing
learning on optimal policies. In section 5, we perform a comparative analysis
of distributions on the learning planner’s optimal consumption. In section 6,
the eﬀect of learning on the transition path is brieﬂy discussed. Section 7
presents some ﬁnal remarks for future research. All proofs are relegated to
the appendix.
2M o d e l
Brock-Mirman Environment. Consider an economy in which output is
determined by the production function f(k,η), f1 > 0, f11 < 0, as introduced
in Mirman (1970). Here, k is capital and η is a realization of the random
production shock ˜ η. The p.d.f of ˜ η is φ(η|θ∗)f o rη ∈ H ⊂ R, which depends
on a parameter θ∗ ∈ Θ ⊂ RN for N ∈ N. The relationship between the
6distribution of ˜ η and the parameter θ∗ is strictly monotonic.
Each period, a planner divides output y between consumption c and in-
vestment k = y − c. Capital k is used for the production of output ˆ y in the
subsequent period, i.e.,
ˆ y = f(y − c,η). (1)
The objective is to maximize the expected sum of discounted utilities, where
the discount factor is δ ∈ (0,1) and the utility function is u(c), u  > 0, u   < 0.
Expectations are taken with respect to the sequence of future production
shocks.
We ﬁrst recall the informed growth model of Brock and Mirman (1972),
where the planner faces no structural uncertainty, i.e., the planner is informed
because θ∗ is known. Given θ∗, the informed planner anticipates the eﬀect













yielding optimal consumption gI(y;θ∗).
Learning Planning. We now relax the assumption of no structural
uncertainty. Here, the planner faces structural uncertainty because θ∗ is not
known. Structural uncertainty is characterized by a priori beliefs about θ∗,
expressed as a prior p.d.f. ξ on Θ. That is, the probability that θ∗ ∈ S is

S ξ(θ)dθ for any S ⊂ Θ.
Structural uncertainty leads to learning and, thus, evolves over time. In-
deed, the planner observes η, which yields information, and uses Bayesian





for θ ∈ Θ, by Bayes’ Theorem. Bayes’ rule (3) characterizes the learning pro-
cess through the updating of beliefs in light of the information gleaned from
observing η. Observing η directly, allows us to focus on an environment with
learning but no experimentation. Indeed, (3) is independent of consumption.
7The learning planner makes consumption and investment decisions, while
learning about θ∗. That is, endowed with initial output and beliefs, consump-
tion and investment are chosen. The production shock η is then realized and
the output, in the subsequent period, is determined from (1). Information is
gleaned from observing η, which, from (3), aﬀects beliefs about θ∗.
A learning planner’s decisions are subject to both (1) and (3). Indeed, the
learning planner anticipates the eﬀect of the production shock on both future

















subject to (3), yielding optimal consumption gL(y,ξ).
Learning increases the uncertainty of future payoﬀs by introducing two
sources of risk: structural uncertainty and uncertainty from the anticipation
of learning. In other words, there are two distinct components of learning.
The ﬁrst is about beliefs. While the informed planner’s beliefs about
θ∗ are degenerate, the learning planner’s are nondegenerate. There is an
increase in uncertainty of future payoﬀs when knowledge of the distribution
of the production shock, φ(η|θ∗) in (2), is replaced by the expected p.d.f. of
˜ η with respect to beliefs ξ,

Θ φ(η|θ)ξ(θ)dθ in (4).
The second component concerns anticipation, i.e., learning is anticipated
using Bayesian updating. In a dynamic context, rational expectations imply
that the information contained in the future production shock is anticipated.
Anticipation of learning is integrated into (4) by anticipating the updated
beliefs from ξ to ˆ ξ(·|η) using (3).
Nonseparability of Control and Learning. The anticipation of learn-
ing is related to the nonseparability of control and learning since the optimal
policy takes account of the change in beliefs which is contained in the subse-
quent period expected value function. In other words, separation of control
and learning occurs if and only if there is no anticipation component.
The anticipation of updated beliefs aﬀects optimal behavior because the
8dynamics given in (1) and (3) are entwined through the production shock.3
If the only link between periods were beliefs, i.e., no capital accumulation,
then the anticipation of learning would have no eﬀect on optimization.
In order to study the eﬀect of introducing learning, overall and through its
two components, we introduce the intermediate case of an adaptive learner.4
As with the learning planner, the adaptive learning planner does not know
θ∗, and has beliefs about it expressed as a p.d.f ξ on Θ. However, unlike the
learning planner, the adaptive learning planner does not anticipate learning.
Given beliefs, the adaptive learning planner anticipates the eﬀect of the
production shock solely on future output, while beliefs are assumed to re-
main constant in his objective function. Therefore, the value function of the
















yielding optimal consumption gAL(y;ξ). The adaptive learning planner does,
however, update beliefs in each period. Once information arrives, the adap-
tive learning planner adapts and updates beliefs, subject to (3). Therefore,
the adaptive learning planner reacts to new information, but does not antic-
ipate it.
Note that the informed and adaptive learning planners diﬀer solely in the
distribution of the production shock. Indeed, knowledge of the distribution
of the production shock, φ(η|θ∗) in (2), is replaced by the expected p.d.f. of ˜ η
with respect to beliefs ξ,






























dη = ξ(θ)( 6 )
for θ ∈ Θ.
4See Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for a detailed exposition of adaptive learning. See
also Milani (2007).
9planner faces a more variable distribution of the production shock than the
informed planner.
Comparisons. While comparing informed and learning planners cap-
tures the overall eﬀect of introducing learning in growth, the introduction
of the intermediate case of an adaptive learning planner allows us to study
the beliefs and anticipation components independently. First, comparing (2)
and (7) captures the beliefs component, i.e., the risk generated from not
knowing θ∗. Second, comparing (4) and (7) captures the anticipation com-
ponent, i.e., the risk generated from uncertain posterior beliefs.
Remarks. In general, dynamic programs with learning such as (4) are in-
tractable, i.e., they are not solvable either analytically or numerically, when
there is no separability of control and learning.5 The problem is not only
whether a solution exists, but if a solution can be characterized and its prop-
erties studied. Two aspects of dynamic programming with learning should
be noted.
First, (4) depends on the variable y and the prior p.d.f ξ on Θ. Unless
the space Θ contains a ﬁnite number of elements, the state space (y,ξ)i s
inﬁnitely-dimensioned, yielding the curse of dimensionality.
Second, the evolution of beliefs, according to Bayes’ law, does not pre-
vent the prior and posterior p.d.f.’s ξ and ˆ ξ(·|η) from belonging to diﬀer-
ent families. This makes the solution of an inﬁnite-horizon dynamic pro-
gramming problem with Bayesian dynamics generally intractable. Indeed,
the learning planner makes consumption and investment decisions, antici-
pating updating beliefs every period. In other words, the value function,
V

f(y − c,η), ˆ ξ(·|η)

in (4), encompasses beliefs that have been updated
inﬁnitely many times. These updated beliefs may belong to many diﬀerent
families of distributions.
Learning with general functions and distributions has focused on exis-
tence as well as limit beliefs and actions.6 Studies that characterize optimal
policies are always in the context of speciﬁc functional forms, the space of
5When there is separability, the dynamic program becomes a standard growth problem,
so that the learning planner is identical to the adaptive learning planner.
6See Easley and Kiefer (1988, 1989), Kiefer and Nyarko (1989), Aghion et al. (1991),
El-Gamal and Sundaram (1993), among others.
10the unknown parameter restricted to two values, ﬁnite periods, or the use
of conjugate priors, especially the normal distribution.7 While we special-
ize the model in order to obtain tractable solutions for (2), (4), and (7)
within a well-known class of optimal stochastic growth models, we charac-
terize optimal consumption and investment with results that hold for general
distributions.
3 Optimal Consumption and Investment
In order to deal with the complexities of learning in growth, we focus on
the class of optimal stochastic growth models studied by Mirman and Zilcha
(1975) with the following assumptions.
Assumption 3.1. The utility function is u(c)=l nc.
Assumption 3.2. The production function is Cobb-Douglas, f(k,η)=kη.
Assumption 3.3. The support of ˜ η is H =[ 0 ,1] and η is observable.
Assumptions 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 hold for the remainder of the paper. The
model with log utility, Cobb-Douglas production, and general distributions
of the production shock and beliefs about θ∗ yields closed-form solutions
for optimal consumptions in the cases of informed, adaptive learning, and
learning.
The combination of log utility and Cobb-Douglas production is needed to
obtain a tractable characterization of optimal consumption and investment in
a learning context. For log utility and the Cobb-Douglas production function
f(k,η)=ηkα, α ∈ [0,1], learning about the distribution of ˜ η has no eﬀect
because the multiplicative shock plays no role. Moreover, making the utility
function more general, while keeping a Cobb-Douglas production function
leads to intractability.
The Mirman-Zilcha class of models has three features that makes the
analysis possible. First, Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 imply that optimal con-
sumption and investment are linear in output in the no learning case. The
7See the rest of the literature on learning in footnote 1.
11linearity property remains under learning, although the fraction of output
consumed now depends on beliefs and evolves with new information.
Second, from Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, the uncertainty in outcomes, i.e.,
the random production shock, enters the optimization problem through its
mean. In other words, the Mirman and Zilcha (1975) class of models displays
certainty equivalence. This feature is exploited in the learning case since the
uncertainty in outcomes is mapped to its mean, implying that the unknown
parameter aﬀects optimal consumption solely through μ(θ)=
 1
0 ηφ(η|θ)dη,
the mean of ˜ η given θ ∈ Θ. The relationship between the mean of the produc-
tion shock and the unknown parameter is the key in determining the eﬀect
of learning on the optimal consumption function and comparative analysis.
Third, Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 imply that no assumption is needed on
the production shock, as well as on the distribution of prior beliefs. The
Mirman-Zilcha class of models does away with all the diﬃculties inherent in
Bayesian analysis. In particular, the prior need not belong to the conjugate
family of the distribution of the production shock. In other words, solutions
for optimal consumption and investment are valid for a wide range of priors,
even those that are outside of families of distributions that are closed under
sampling.
We ﬁrst state the optimal consumptions of both the informed and adap-
tive learning planners. We then present and illustrate the optimal consump-
tion of the learning agent.
Benchmark Models. From Mirman-Zilcha, the optimal consumption




while the optimal consumption of the adaptive learning planner, correspond-










The presence of structural uncertainty does not aﬀect the optimal consump-
tion function, since the true expectation of ˜ η, E[˜ η|θ∗]=μ(θ∗)i n( 8 ) ,i s
12replaced by the expectation of ˜ η given beliefs, E[˜ η|ξ]=

Θ μ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ in (9).
Learning Planner. In the appendix, we show that the value function
of the learning planner is of the form,
VL(y,ξ)=κ1(ξ)lny + κ2(ξ), (10)
where κ1(ξ)=

Θ(1 − δμ(θ))−1ξ(θ)dθ and κ2(ξ) depends on ξ.









Despite the fact that this class of growth models displays certainty equiv-
alence, certainty equivalence does not imply the separation of control and
learning. Indeed, the anticipation of learning changes the optimal consump-
tion function for the learning planner.
We present four examples that show the wide applicability of our model,
not only in terms of distributions, but also in terms of general unknown
structures. For instance, normal distributions are not needed to get analytic
results. In Example 3.5, the case of learning about two unknown parame-
ters is presented. Example 3.6 deals with a uniform distribution for ˜ η with
unknown support. Example 3.7 illustrates the case in which the learning
planner does not know to which family ˜ η belongs, as well as not knowing
the parameters characterizing each family. Finally, Example 3.8 shows that
the model encompasses the case of an informed planner with degenerate be-
liefs. That is, in Example 3.8, the planner knows the distribution of ˜ η,a si n
Mirman-Zilcha.
Example 3.5. Let ˜ η have a beta distribution with unknown parameters θ =






1 − δα/(α + β)
−1
y. (12)
13Example 3.6. Let ˜ η have a uniform distribution with unknown support [0,θ],









Example 3.7. Let Θ = {θ1,θ 2},w h e r eθ1 represents a beta distribution with
unknown parameters (α,β), and beliefs ξB(α,β), α,β > 0, while θ2 represents
a truncated normal distribution with support [0,1], unknown parameters
(m,σ2), and beliefs ξN(m,σ2), m>0,σ 2 ∈ R++.I f0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 is the prior



















where μ1(α,β) is the mean of a beta random variable with parameters (α,β)
and μ2(m,σ2) is the mean of a truncated normal random variable with pa-
rameters (m,σ2).
Example 3.8. Let the beliefs be denoted as ξ∗ be degenerate at θ∗, i.e., ξ∗(θ)=
1f o rθ = θ∗ and ξ∗(θ)=0f o rθ ∈ Θ\{θ∗}. Then, gL(y,ξ∗)=( 1− δμ(θ∗))y,
which is identical to (8).
4 The Eﬀect of Learning on Optimal Policies
Learning increases the uncertainty of future payoﬀs, which aﬀects the ex-
pected marginal utility of investment. As noted previously, learning intro-
duces two sources of risk about future payoﬀs: structural uncertainty and
uncertainty from the anticipation of learning. Structural uncertainty is the
beliefs component, while uncertainty from the anticipation of learning is the
anticipation component. In this section, we study the overall eﬀect of intro-
ducing learning through both its beliefs and anticipation components.
Our results extend the literature on the eﬀect of an increase in risk on
optimal consumption and investment to a learning environment. Previous
literature has focused on models in which the planner knows the distributions
14of stochastic variables. In this literature, the eﬀect of an increase in risk on
optimal policy functions depends on the second derivative of some functions
of the random variable being studied.8
In the learning case, the eﬀect of an increase in risk also depends on the
second derivatives of some functions of the appropriate random variable. To


























Here, R(x)=x(1 − δx)−1, R ,R    > 0, for x ∈ [0,1] characterizes the eﬀect
of uncertainty in outcomes due to the random production shock ˜ η on the
expected marginal utility of investment.
From (15) and (16), structural uncertainty aﬀects the expected marginal
utility of investment. Here, it is the second derivative of the mean of the
production shock, with respect to the unknown parameter, that determines
the eﬀect of an increase in risk due to structural uncertainty.
Moreover, from (16) and (17), the anticipation of learning aﬀects the
expected marginal utility of investment. Here, it is the convexity of R that
determines the eﬀect of an increase in risk due to the anticipation of learning.
Finally, from (15) and (17), the overall eﬀect of learning on optimal con-
sumption is characterized by the expectation of R with respect to beliefs ξ.
Here, it is the second derivative of R with respect to the unknown parameter
8Consider a two-period model in which the planner maximizes u(c)+δE[u(f(y − c, ˜ η)]
over c.I fˆ y = f(y −c)+η, then it is the convexity of the marginal utility of consumption
that leads to precautionary investment. If ˆ y = ηf(y − c), then it is the convexity of
ηf (y − c)u (ηf(y − c)) with respect to η that leads to precautionary investment.
15that determines the overall eﬀect of introducing learning through both its
beliefs and anticipation components.
Nonseparability of Control and Learning. Since the dynamic ef-
fect of output (y − c)−1 is entwined with the term R and its expectation
with respect to ξ, Thus, control and learning are entwined and cannot be
separated.
The nonseparability of control and learning is revealed by comparing (16)
and (17), which also determines the impact of the anticipation component
of learning. Proposition 4.1 states that the anticipation of learning always
decreases optimal consumption. Formally,
Proposition 4.1. gAL(y;ξ) >g L(y,ξ).
Proposition 4.1 is due to the convexity of R, and, thus, the expected
marginal utility of investment, and the use of Jensen’s inequality on the
right-hand sides of (16) and (17). The risk generated from the anticipation
of learning increases the expected marginal utility of investment, leading to
a decrease in consumption or precautionary investment.
Beliefs and Anticipation Components. Next, the eﬀect of intro-
ducing learning in an optimal growth model, when beliefs are unbiased, is
studied. First, we consider beliefs about the mean of the production shock
that are unbiased, i.e., μ(θ∗)=

Θ μ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ. Second, we focus on beliefs
about the parameter θ∗ that are unbiased, i.e., θ∗ =

Θ θξ(θ)dθ.I n b o t h
case, conditions are established under which the introduction of learning,
overall and through each of its components, increases or decreases optimal
consumption using (15), (16) and (17). In other words, gI(y;θ∗), gAL(y;ξ),
and gL(y,ξ) are ordered.
In Proposition 4.2, the eﬀect of learning when beliefs are unbiased about
the mean of the production shock is studied. From (15) and (16), risk from
structural uncertainty does not change the expected marginal utility of in-
vestment, since the uncertainty in outcomes is characterized only through
its mean. Since the true mean of the production shock and unbiased beliefs
about the true mean of the production shock have the same eﬀect on behav-
ior, there is certainty equivalence. Therefore, the total eﬀect of learning is
16due to the anticipation of learning. As established in Proposition 4.1, the risk
generated from the anticipation component increases the expected marginal
utility of investment, leading to precautionary investment. Formally,
Proposition 4.2. Suppose beliefs are unbiased about the mean of the pro-
duction shock, μ(θ∗)=

Θ μ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ. Then, learning decreases optimal con-
sumption, and gI(y;θ∗)=gAL(y;ξ) >g L(y,ξ).
In Proposition 4.3, the eﬀect of learning when beliefs are unbiased about
the unknown parameter, θ∗ =

Θ θξ(θ)dθ, is studied. The eﬀect of learning
in this case is not as simple as in Proposition 4.2. The reasons is that
both sources of risk due to learning are at work here. Indeed, the eﬀect of
structural uncertainty depends on the second derivative of the mean of the
production shock with respect to θ. If the mean of the production shock
with respect to θ is concave, then structural uncertainty increases optimal
consumption. In other words, as structural uncertainty is introduced, with
θ∗ replaced by unbiased beliefs about θ∗, the marginal utility of investment
decreases, inducing less investment. And, the marginal utility of investment
increases with convexity, inducing more investment.
This point is illustrated in Example 3.5 in which ˜ η has a beta distribution
with parameters α,β > 0. If α ≡ θ is unknown and β is known, then
μ  (θ)=−2β/(θ+β)3 < 0, and structural uncertainty increases consumption.
However, if α is known and β ≡ θ is unknown, then μ  (θ)=2 α/(α+θ)3 > 0,
and structural uncertainty decreases consumption.
The total eﬀect depends on the strengths and directions of the beliefs and
anticipation components. If the mean of the production shock with respect
to the parameter is convex, then both types of risk work in the same direction
and optimal consumption decreases. However, if the mean of the production
shock is concave, then both types of risk pull in opposite directions and the
eﬀect of learning depends on the strength of each risk. Mathematically, it is
the second derivative of R with respect to θ that determines the strength of




μ  (θ)(1 − δμ(θ)) + 2δμ (θ)2
(1 − δμ(θ))3 , (18)
17for θ ∈ Θ. The sign of (18) is determined by the sign of μ   and the relation-
ship μ    −2δμ 2/(1 − δμ). Formally,




1. If μ   > 0,t h e ngI(y;θ∗) >g AL(y;ξ) >g L(y,ξ).
2. If μ   =0 ,t h e ngI(y;θ∗)=gAL(y;ξ) >g L(y,ξ).
3. If −2δmu 2/(1 − δμ) <μ    < 0,t h e ngL(y,ξ) <g I(y;θ∗) <g AL(y;ξ).
4. If μ   = −2δmu 2/(1 − δμ),t h e ngL(y,ξ)=gI(y;θ∗) <g AL(y;ξ).
5. If μ   < −2δmu 2/(1 − δμ),t h e ngI(y;θ∗) <g L(y,ξ) <g AL(y;ξ).
In case 1, the convexity of the mean of the production shock implies
that structural uncertainty decreases consumption, as does the anticipation
component. In other words, the two types of risk work in the same direction.
In case 2, the mean of the production shock is linear in θ, so that structural
uncertainty has no eﬀect on the expected marginal utility of investment.
Here, consumption decreases solely due to the anticipation component. In
case 3, the mean of the production shock is concave. Here, the beliefs and
anticipation components pull in opposite directions. The beliefs component
increases, while the anticipation component, as is always the case, decreases
consumption. But the mean of the production shock is not concave enough
for the beliefs component to be dominant, and the overall eﬀect of learning
is to decrease consumption. Case 4 is a knife-edge case in which beliefs and
anticipation components pull in opposite directions in equal strength. In
case 5, the beliefs and anticipation components pull in opposite directions,
but the mean of the production shock is concave enough to overwhelm the
anticipation component. Thus, consumption increases.
5C o m p a r a t i v e A n a l y s i s
In this section, the eﬀect of diﬀerent properties of the signal and initial beliefs
on the learning planner’s optimal consumption is studied. Speciﬁcally, we
18study the eﬀect of changes in the mean and riskiness of the distribution φ
of the production shock ˜ η as well as beliefs ξ about θ∗ using the concepts
of ﬁrst-order and second-order stochastic dominance. Note that the concept
of second-order stochastic dominance has been used implicitly in Section 4
where the eﬀect of an increase in risk due to the introduction of learning is
studied. The eﬀect of riskier distributions on optimal consumption has been
studied only in stochastic dynamic models in which the planner knows the
distributions of stochastic variables. This analysis is extended to the learning
case.
To facilitate the discussion, let g
j
L(y,ξ) denote optimal consumption and
μj(θ)=
 1
0 ηφj(η|θ)dη, for the distribution φj.M o r e o v e r ,l e tgL(y,ξj)d e n o t e
optimal consumption with respect to ξj, j =1 ,2.
First, the deﬁnitions of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance and second-order
stochastic dominance are stated.
Deﬁnition 5.1. The p.d.f. ϕ1 ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the p.d.f.





Deﬁnition 5.2. For any two p.d.f.’s ϕ1 and ϕ2, ϕ1 second-order stochasti-
cally dominates the p.d.f. ϕ2, ϕ1  2 ϕ2, i.e., ϕ1 is less risky than ϕ2, if, for





5.1 Properties of the Signal
Proposition 5.3 shows that a higher mean of the production shock ˜ η decreases
consumption.
Proposition 5.3. If φ1  1 φ2,t h e ng1
L(y,ξ) ≤ g2
L(y,ξ).
From (17), the expected marginal utility of investment is greater under φ1
than under φ2 for φ1  1 φ2, inducing more investment and less consumption.9
9This result is in contrast to the literature that analyzes the eﬀect of signals on future
productivity on the business cycle, where it is established that the anticipation of a higher
expected production shock in the long-run reduces current investment and increases cur-
rent consumption. The reason for the diﬀerent result is that, in that literature, investment
19Proposition 5.4 shows that an increase in the riskiness of the distribution
of the production shock ˜ η has no eﬀect on consumption.
Proposition 5.4. If φ1  2 φ2,t h e ng1
L(y,ξ)=g2
L(y,ξ).
From (17), only μ(θ) aﬀects the expected marginal utility of investment.
Hence, in this class of models, the learning agent reacts to the anticipation of
learning, independent of the amount of learning that takes place. Speciﬁcally,
the informativeness of the signal has no eﬀect on decisions. In other words,
certainty equivalence regarding the random production shock continues to
hold in this model with the introduction of learning.
Finally, changes in the mean and riskiness of the distribution of the pro-
duction shock have a dynamic eﬀect on consumption in the subsequent period
through updating beliefs. Indeed, if φ1  1 φ2 or φ1  2 φ2,t h e nˆ ξ1  = ˆ ξ2,f o r
the same η. Hence, g1
L(ˆ y, ˆ ξ1)  = g2
L(ˆ y, ˆ ξ2).
5.2 Properties of Prior Beliefs
Proposition 5.5 shows the eﬀect of more optimistic beliefs about θ∗ on con-
sumption. The eﬀect of more optimistic beliefs depends on the ﬁrst derivative
of μ(θ).
Proposition 5.5. Suppose that ξ1  1 ξ2.
1. If μ  > 0,t h e ngL(y,ξ1) ≤ gL(y,ξ2).
2. If μ  < 0,t h e ngL(y,ξ1) ≥ gL(y,ξ2).
3. If μ  =0 ,t h e ngL(y,ξ1)=gL(y,ξ2).
is delayed until the increase in the expected production shock occurs. Then, it is more
proﬁtable to invest. See Beaudry and Portier (2004), Beaudry and Portier (2006), Beaudry
and Portier (2007), Christiano et al. (2006), and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006). The op-
posite result is established here because the planner faces a higher expected production
shock for the next period, hence current investment is more proﬁtable and, thus, increases
immediately.
20From (17), if μ  > 0, then ξ1  1 ξ2 implies that the expected marginal
utility of investment is greater under ξ1 than under ξ2. Here, more opti-
mistic beliefs about the production shock induces more investment and less
consumption.
While, as stated in Proposition 5.4, a riskier distribution of ˜ η does not
aﬀect consumption, Proposition 5.6 shows that riskier beliefs about θ∗ does
aﬀect consumption. Proposition 5.6 generalizes Proposition 4.3. Recall that
in Proposition 4.3, informed and learning planners are compared by increas-
ing risk around θ∗. Here, two learning planners, one with riskier beliefs about
θ∗ than the other are compared.
As in Proposition 4.3, the eﬀect of a riskier prior on consumption is
determined by the sign of (18). Formally,
Proposition 5.6. Suppose that ξ1  2 ξ2.
1. If μ   < −2δmu 2/(1 − δμ),t h e ngL(y,ξ1) ≤ gL(y,ξ2).
2. If μ   > −2δmu 2/(1 − δμ),t h e ngL(y,ξ1) ≥ gL(y,ξ2).
3. If μ   = −2δmu 2/(1 − δμ),t h e ngL(y,ξ1)=gL(y,ξ2).
The discussion is similar to the one for Proposition 4.3. In case 1, the be-
liefs and anticipation components pull in opposite directions, but the mean of
the production shock is concave enough to overwhelm the anticipation com-
ponent. Thus, as beliefs become riskier, consumption decreases. In case 2,
the anticipation component is dominant, implying that the expected marginal
utility of investment is convex in θ, leading to precautionary investment as
beliefs become riskier. In case 3, both beliefs and anticipation components
pull in opposite directions in equal strength, implying that the expected
marginal utility of investment is linear in θ. There is no reaction to riskier
beliefs.10
Finally, changes in the mean and riskiness of beliefs have a dynamic
eﬀect on consumption in the subsequent period through updating beliefs.
10It is possible to extend Proposition 4.2 by comparing two learning planners, one with
riskier beliefs about μ(θ∗) than the other one. As in Proposition 4.2, consumption always
decreases as beliefs about μ(θ∗) become riskier.
21Indeed, if ξ1  1 ξ2 or ξ1  2 ξ2,t h e nˆ ξ1  = ˆ ξ2, for the same η. Hence,
gL(ˆ y, ˆ ξ1)  = gL(ˆ y, ˆ ξ2).
6 Transition Path
While the anticipation of learning increases the uncertainty of future pay-
oﬀs, learning itself decreases structural uncertainty along the transition path.
Therefore, the learning planner generally converges to the informed planner.
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss the eﬀect of learning along the transition
path. The rate of convergence of the learning planner depends upon how
quickly and accurately information can be gleaned from observations. In
other words, it is the ﬂow and processing of information that determines the
diﬀerence between the informed and learning planners’ transition paths.
Flow of Information. The ﬂow of information depends on the prop-
erties of the distribution of the signal. For example, a more diﬀuse signal
decreases the ﬂow of information, which slows down learning. Indeed, Fig-
ure 1 shows that the fraction of output consumed by a learning planner with
a diﬀuse signal converges more slowly than a learning planner with a tight
signal. Figure 1 reports simulations from a simpliﬁed version of Example 3.5
with δ =0 .99. The learning planner with a diﬀuse signal knows that α =0 .4,
but not that β =0 .4 and has ﬂat initial beliefs about β on {0.2,0.4,0.6}.
The learning planner with a tight signal knows that α =1 .4, but not that
β =1 .4, and has ﬂat initial beliefs about β on {1.2,1.4,1.6}.
Processing of Information. The processing of information through
Bayesian updating depends in part on initial beliefs. The more biased prior
beliefs are, the slower is the convergence of the learning planner. Consider
again a simpliﬁed version of example 3.5 with δ =0 .99. The learning planner
knows that α =0 .4, but not that β =0 .4. Beliefs have support {0.2,0.4,0.6}.
Figure 2 shows that the fraction of output consumed by a learning planner
with biased beliefs, i.e., ρ0.2 =0 .9,ρ 0.4 =0 .05,ρ 0.6 =0 .05, converges slower
than the one with initial unbiased beliefs, i.e., ρ0.2 = ρ0.4 = ρ0.6 =1 /3.




















































Figure 1: Tight vs. Diﬀuse Signal






















































Figure 2: Biased vs. Unbiased Beliefs
237F i n a l R e m a r k s
In our model, the planner observes the production shock directly. There are
situations in which it is reasonable to assume that η is not observable. In
this case, output ˆ y is the signal used to update beliefs about θ∗.11 This for-
mulation leads to experimentation if the relationship between ˆ y and η is not
strictly monotonic, i.e., η cannot be inferred from observing ˆ y. Therefore, the
value function with capital accumulation and experimentation is, in general,
no longer concave. Future research should focus on characterizing optimal
policies under experimentation to understand how the planner aﬀects the
ﬂow of information in reaction to the anticipation of learning.12
11Note that observing output and not the production shock might lead to incomplete
learning. See Appendix B.
12Previous work in growth has only characterized optimal policies in a setup with three
periods and a two-value support of the unknown parameter. See Bertocchi and Spagat
(1998) and Datta et al. (2002).
24AP r o o f s
Proof of Proposition 3.4. We conjecture that the value function of the
learning planner is of the form VL(y,ξ)=κ1(ξ)lny +κ2(ξ), where κ1 and κ2
























































































































































































0 ηφ(η|θ)dη. To verify that (26) is the solution to (25),




































































































Since both the utility and production functions are strictly concave in c, (36)
is the unique maximizer corresponding to (19).
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Since R  (x)=2 δ/(1 − δx)3 > 0, the right-
hand side of (16) is less than the right-hand side of (17) for any c,b yJ e n s e n ’ s
inequality. Therefore, gAL(y;ξ) >g L(y,ξ).
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Suppose μ(θ∗)=

Θ μ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ.F i r s t ,
gI(y;θ∗)=gAL(y;ξ) from (15) and (16). Second, gAL(y;ξ) >g L(y,ξ)f r o m
Proposition 4.1. Therefore, gI(y;θ∗)=gAL(y;ξ) >g L(y,ξ).
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Suppose θ∗ =

Θ θξ(θ)dθ.F i r s t , i f μ   <
−2δmu 2/(1−δμ), then, for any c, the right-hand side of (15) is greater than
the right-hand side of (17) by Jensen’s inequality. Therefore, gI(y;θ∗) <
27gL(y,ξ). The proofs for μ   > −2δμ 2/(1 − δμ)a n dμ   = −2δμ 2/(1 − δμ)
are identical. Second, if μ   < 0, then, for any c, the right-hand side of (15)
is greater than the right-hand side of (16), since μ(θ∗) >

Θ μ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ by
Jensen’s inequality. Therefore, gI(y;θ∗) <g AL(y;ξ). The proofs for μ   > 0
and μ   = 0 are identical. Third, gAL(y;ξ) >g L(y,ξ) from Proposition 4.1.
Combining these three points yields Proposition 4.2.




0 ηφ2(η|θ)dη = μ2(θ) implying that g1
L(y,ξ) ≤ g2
L(y,ξ).




0 ηφ2(η|θ)dη = μ2(θ) implying that g1
L(y,ξ)=g2
L(y,ξ).
Proof of Proposition 5.5. Suppose that ξ1  1 ξ2.I fμ  > 0, then, for
every c, the expected marginal return on investment in (17) is greater under
ξ1 than under ξ2. Therefore, gL(y,ξ1) ≤ gL(y,ξ2). The proofs for μ  < 0a n d
μ  = 0 are identical.
Proof of Proposition 5.6. Suppose that ξ1  2 ξ2.I fμ   < −2δmu 2/(1−
δμ), then, for every c, the expected marginal return on investment in (17) is
greater under ξ1 than under ξ2, by Jensen’s inequality. Therefore, gL(y,ξ1) ≤
gL(y,ξ2). The proofs for μ   > −2δmu 2/(1−δμ)a n dμ   = −2δmu 2/(1−δμ)
are identical.
B Complete and Incomplete Learning
Let ˆ y = f(y − g(y,ξ),η), where g(y,ξ) is optimal consumption and η is an
unobserved realization of ˜ η. Suppose that the support of ˜ η is H =[ α,β]w i t h
0 <α<β<1a n d
min{f(k,α),f(k,β)}≤f(k,η) ≤ max{f(k,α),f(k,β)}
for k = y − g(y,ξ)a n dη ∈ [α,β].
Figure 3 illustrates the case in which complete learning occurs under posi-
tive consumption. In the case of no consumption, the stochastic steady state
is degenerate at y3, i.e., ˆ y = y3 for any θ∗ and η ∈ [α,β]. If the agent is








Figure 3: Complete Learning
However, under positive consumption, the stochastic steady state is nonde-
generate with support [y1,y 2], so that the agent eventually learns, from any
initial output.
There is a case in which complete learning cannot occur under positive
consumption. This is illustrated in Figure 4. In the case of no consumption,
the stochastic steady state is nondegenerate with support [y2,y 3]. Here, the
agent with zero consumption eventually learns. However, under positive
consumption, the stochastic steady state is degenerate at y1. Here, ˆ y = y1









Figure 4: Incomplete Learning
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